Significant Cases In Which Ain & Bank Attorneys Were Counsel

ESTOPINA v. O’BRIAN, 68 A3d 790

Maryland   |   2013

Trial court considered appropriate factors in granting mother’s request to relocate with minor child.

SIDIBE v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO., 468 F. Supp. 2d 97

Maryland   |   2006

Won Summary judgment for client by establishing that Plaintiff did not have standing to sue on the contract.

HERRICK v. WAIN, 154 Md. App. 222

Maryland   |   2003

In grandparent visitation case, the court considered applied the relevant factors outlined in Fairbanks v. McCarter and fashioned a visitation schedule that served the best interests of the children; therefore, father’s due process rights as a parent have not been abrogated.

DUFFY v. DUFFY, 881 A.2d 630

Maryland   |   2005

When they separated, several years before their divorce, the parties entered an agreement in the form of a counter-signed letter. When it entered the final divorce decree, the trial court held that the parties had an enforceable contract. The appellate court affirmed the trial court finding that all essential terms of the contract were present and it was clear the parties meant to be bound by it.

BENNETT HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING v. NATIONSBANK of MARYLAND, 103 Md. App. 749

Maryland   |   1995

A contractor and subcontractors that were not parties to foreclosure proceedings were permitted nevertheless to challenge a judgment if they established that the judgment was procured by fraud.

DIEP v. RIVAS, 126 Md. App. 133

Maryland   |   1999

Because under the Slayer rule, appellants’ brother never acquired any interest in the proceeds under the insurance policies, appellants, as secondary beneficiaries, had no interest to assert in the proceeds.

MONTGOMERY CABLEVISION LTD. PSHP. v. BEYNON, 116 Md. App. 363

Maryland   |   1997

Damages for pre-impact fright were improper in survival action arising from automobile accident where death was instant upon impact because victim could not have suffered any injury capable of objective determination as a result of pre-impact fright.

CRAWFORD v. LEAHY, 326 Md. 160

Maryland   |   1992

A patient could not partially reject an arbitration panel’s malpractice award and bring an action contesting only the damages portion of the award. The patient’s action to nullify the award had to present both issues of liability and damages.

BENNETT HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING v. NATIONSBANK, 342 Md. 169

Maryland   |   1996

That the bank and the developers had agreed on a “friendly foreclosure” in order to extinguish the claims of junior lienors was an insufficient allegation, without evidence of fraud or misrepresentation, to have the foreclosure sale set aside.

BEYNON v. MONTGOMERY CABLEVISION LTD, 351 Md. 460

Maryland   |   1998

Pre-impact fright, a form of mental or emotional disturbance or distress, that was suffered by an automobile accident victim who died instantly upon impact was a legally compensable element of damages in a survival action.

DIEP v. RIVAS, 357 Md. 668

Maryland   |   2000

Murderer’s survivors were entitled to receive insurance benefits because policy directed payment to murderer’s survivors and they were not disqualified under slayer’s rule since they were not claiming through murderer.

TYDINGS v. TYDINGS, 567 A.2d 886

Maryland   |   1989

The trial court had discretion to require the ex-husband to pay any portion of the ex-wife’s attorney and witness fees even though the ex-wife became a very wealthy woman as a result of the marital property distribution

JONES v. HOWARD UNIVERSITY, 589 A.2d 419

Maryland   |   1991

Mother who underwent diagnostic x-ray and surgery while pregnant could recover under zone of danger theory for severe and verifiable mental distress if the jury believed the procedures presented a threat to her health or that of her unborn twins.

ESTATE OF REAP v. MALLOY, 727 A.2d 326

Divorce   |   Maryland   |   1999

Summary judgment was improper where a genuine dispute existed as to whether husband and wife entered into a property settlement agreement upon their divorce, such that wife’s will making husband her beneficiary could have been impliedly revoked.

IN RE ESTATE OF BURLESON, 738 A.2d 1199

Maryland   |   1999

A prior will was revoked upon the execution of a later will and, assuming revocation of the later will, there was no evidence presented suggesting that the deceased had revived the prior will.

MELROD v. MELROD, 83 Md. App. 180

Alimony, Divorce   |   Maryland   |   1990

Monetary, alimony, and counsel fees awards in a final divorce order were improper when the trial court misconstrued Maryland law in classifying property as marital or non-marital and abused its discretion in valuing the property.

SCOTT v. RUTHERFOORD, 30 Va. App. 176

Child Custody, Divorce   |   Virginia   |   1999

The circuit court, as the divorce court, did not err in amending a final order more than 21 days after its entry, because the divorce court had continuing jurisdiction to revise its decrees concerning the custody and maintenance of minor children.

HAMEL v. HAMEL, 489 A.2d 471

Child Custody   |   Maryland   |   1985

The lower court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a non-custodial parent to meet with a court-designated psychiatrist before setting a visitation schedule, nor did the lower court improperly delegate responsibility to determine visitation.

KREUZ v. KREUZ, 354 A.2d 867

Alimony   |   Maryland   |   1976

Trial court properly awarded wife alimony pendente lite without considering the merits where the divorce complaint stated a cause of action and was filed in good faith.

EAST v. EAST, 536 A.2d 1103

Child Custody   |   Maryland   |   1987

Where there was evidence on both sides of issue of whether there was common-law marriage between parties to separation action, trial court’s finding of such marriage was not disturbed. Trial court had broad discretion in reconsidering child support.

KRAMER v. KRAMER, Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1205

Maryland   |   March 13, 1996

Wife awarded $831,000 in legal fees and expenses during the pendency of divorce case, where Husband had no assets in his name, yet he used and controlled various trusts, corporations, and offshore entities containing millions of dollars and had engaged in oppressive and burdensome tactics to frustrate Wife’s discovery and access to information.